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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAE ADAMSON, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010516-CA 
RANAE ADAMSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner") submits the following as his reply 
brief to the Brief of Appellee in the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Order Denying 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce ("Order Denying Petition to Modify"), is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below was a trial on a petition to modify a decree of divorce, and the order 
appealed from is the Order Denying Petition to Modify. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: The Petitioner's case is ripe for review 
by this Court; the lower Court did abuse its discretion in finding there was not a substantial and 
material change of circumstances warranting a modification of alimony; and the issue of 
whether or not to grant the Petitioner's requested modification is clear and should not be 
remanded, necessitating further costs and fees for both parties. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and cases are dispositive of the issues outlined above: Utah 
Code Annotated, §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998 and Supp. 2001); Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903 
(Utah App. 2000); Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001) gives the trial court "continuing jurisdiction 
to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based upon a substantial and 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce." 
"The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a substantial 
change of circumstances is presumed valid." Bolliger v. Bolliger 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
App. 2000). The Appellate Court reviews "the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard." 
id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Inasmuch as Respondent has admitted and relied in her responsive brief on Petitioner's 
Statement of the Case, the Petitioner will reference the same Statement of the Case from the 
original Appellate Brief in this Reply Brief. Petitioner relies on his original Statement of the 
Facts and does not dispute the veracity of the Respondent's Statement of the Facts, except to 
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point out that the Statement of the Facts is short and lacks highly relevant facts found in 
Petitioner's original Statement of the Facts in the Brief of Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Respondent's contention that the Petitioner's pending retirement was not an issue ripe 
for adjudication is incorrect. Respondent's own summary of the argument states, "The Utah 
Supreme Court notes that when parties find themselves in a position that may some time in 
the future happen, this question is not ripe before the court for adjudication." Redwood Gvm v. 
Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court is referencing issues that may happen in the sense that they are speculative and not 
within the control of any party to make happen. The Petitioner has control of his ability to 
retire; however, he is choosing not to, so that he can meet his needs and pay his monthly 
alimony obligation to Respondent. The Respondent's use of the word "ripeness" is taken out 
of context. The Respondent would have this Court believe that Petitioner must immediately 
injure himself economically prior to seeking relief from the courts. The inability of the Petitioner 
to retire is, in fact, the injury and the issue that is ripe for adjudication at this time. 
The Respondent's contention that the original trial court took Petitioner's future 
retirement into consideration in issuing an alimony award is incorrect. The lower court could 
not infer that, at the time of divorce, the original trial court contemplated the parties' retirement 
in making its award of alimony. Bolliger v. Bolliger. 997 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah App. 2000). 
Furthermore, Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993), states that whether or not 
a trial court made adequate findings that it foresaw a party's retirement in making an original 
alimony award could not be determined by simply noting that the original Decree allocated 
retirement benefits between the parties. Id. at 253. It is wrong for Respondent to imply that, 
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because the original trial court specifically addressed the Petitioner's retirement and the 
Respondent's on-going financial hardships, the original court meant for the award of alimony to 
be unmodified upon Petitioner's retirement. 
Respondent's claim that the Bolliger case is distinguishable from the case at bar merely 
because the moving party in Bolliger had an "unexpected early retirement" misstates the case. 
Nowhere in Bolliger did the fact that the moving party's retirement was "unexpected" impact the 
reasoning of the appellate court. The fact that the moving party's retirement in that case was 
unexpected is merely stated in the recitation of facts and is not a fact upon which the Bolliger 
decision turned. 
The Court of Appeals need not remand this case as the findings are clear from the trial 
court that, if a substantial and material change of circumstances had been found, the court 
would have modified the award of alimony. As the judge in the trial court stated, the 
Respondent would be "better off" were the Petitioner to retire. Neither party should incur on-
going expenses of remanding this case when, if the Petitioner's Appeal is granted, the result is 
obvious that Petitioner should be allowed to retire and to have the alimony obligation 
terminate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY. 
While the Respondent is correct in stating that Petitioner was almost 66 years old when 
his Petition to Modify came on before the trial court, and that the Petitioner had not yet retired, 
the remaining argument of Respondent regarding ripeness is fundamentally flawed. The 
Respondent goes to great length, citing the case of Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah 
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App. 1991), arguing that Petitioner's issue is not ripe. However, the case at bar is easily 
distinguishable from Adelman. In that case, the court was dealing with survivor benefits that 
might be reinstated if the spouse were to seek divorce from her current husband. In Adelman, 
no evidence was before the court that the spouse was in fact seeking a divorce, or had any 
desire to seek a divorce from her current spouse. Thus, the issues of the potential retirement 
in Adelman were complete speculations. In the case at bar, the Petitioner's retirement is not 
speculative. He is absolutely entitled to his benefits upon retirement; so is Respondent. That 
cannot change. He is past retirement age. It is the Petitioner's inability to retire that is the 
immediate concern. Every other employee working for the State of Utah, who has attained the 
Petitioner's current age, has the right to retire. Thus, the injury to the Petitioner is real, 
tangible, and on-going, i.e., it is ripe. Contrasting this is Adelman, where there was no 
evidence that the spouse seeking potential survivor benefits had a desire to seek a divorce 
from her current husband. It is clear that the case at bar is very different. 
Ripeness is about options: whether to do a thing or whether not to do a thing. In the 
case at bar, Petitioner has no options. He must not retire; otherwise, he will suffer 
economically. Examples given by Respondent show nothing but options-whether a spouse is 
going to decide to become divorced, or not to become divorced; or whether an individual 
wishes to commit a crime or not to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the injury is already 
being done to Petitioner-he cannot retire, though he is absolutely entitled to do so. 
Furthermore, the Respondent has failed to cite anywhere on the record where the trial 
court specifically stated that the denial of the Petition to Modify was due to ripeness. The 
Petitioner quotes the Order Denying Petition to Modify, at 1J16, where it states: 
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The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, 
despite his eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is 
concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will continue past his 
retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his 
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony 
obligation continues. 
Order Denying Petition to Modify, at 1J16. This says nothing of ripeness. It says merely that 
Petitioner's inability to retire had reached a level of concern that he sought a petition to modify. 
Furthermore, Respondent quotes Boyle, et al. v. National Fire Insurance Company, 866 P.2d 
597 (Utah App. 1993), stating "where there exists more than a difference of opinion regarding 
the hypothetical application of [insurance provision] to a situation which the parties might, at 
some future time, find themselves, the questions are ripe for adjudication." Id. In the case 
here, there is no hypothetical situation. The Petitioner is being barred from retirement. The 
Petitioner desires to retire immediately. The only question is whether this Court will allow him 
to terminate his alimony obligation if he retires. There is no "hypothetical" situation where mere 
"opinion" differs regarding a situation which might at some future time occur. The situation is 
present and the issue is most assuredly ripe. 
POINT 2. PETITIONER HAS SHOWN A SUBSTANTIAL 
AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The facts of this case do not support the trial court's finding of a lack of substantial and 
material change in circumstances. For reasons as outlined in the original Brief of Appellant, 
the trial court is specifically barred from finding that the mere mention of retirement benefits in 
the original Decree of Divorce and allocation of retirement benefits necessitate a finding that 
the trial court contemplated the Petitioner's retirement in making its award of alimony. The fact 
that the original trial court stated that the alimony award was to be "permanent" does not mean 
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that it meant for the award of alimony to be non-modifiable. This has been well briefed in the 
original Brief of Appellant and has not been refuted by the Respondent. 
The Respondent's argument flies in the face of the reasoning stated in Bolliger that, 
just because the Decree calls the alimony award permanent, it does not mean the award of 
alimony is non-modifiable. See Bolliger at 908. 
Furthermore, as has been stated in the Brief of Appellant and upheld in Johnson v. 
Johnson, 855. P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993), a mere allocation of retirement benefits by a trial 
court does not mean that the trial court contemplated retirement be paid in conjunction with 
alimony. 
Since the trial court in the instant case [Johnson] divided the 
pension plan between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. 
Johnson's ability to receive additional income in the future that 
would alter her financial condition and needs. Thus, . . . Mrs. 
Johnson could argue that her receipt of retirement benefits was 
an anticipated event and the trial court considered it when 
making the alimony award. Therefore, Mrs. Johnson's receipt of 
retirement benefits might not be considered a material change in 
circumstances, ]d. at 253. 
We do not believe it makes for good law and sound policy to 
have parties arguing years after the fact over what a trial may or 
may not have considered when making an alimony award. Id. 
As has been previously stated in the Brief of Appellant, this speculation is exactly the type of 
speculation engaged in by the trial court below. 
The Respondent would have this Court engage in exactly that type of speculation now. 
The Respondent stated in her brief, on page 13, that "The Court clearly recognized that 
Respondent would have a difficult time in paying her support obligation in that it stated, '[i]n 
any month when the [respondent] fails to make an actual monetary payment to [petitioner] for 
child support, the child support shall be deducted from [respondent's] lien upon the marital 
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residence of the parties.'" This is an attempt by Respondent to entice this Court to speculate 
what the original trial court meant by that language. The only thing that we can safely say the 
original trial court meant by that language is that the Respondent was not likely going to pay 
child support to Petitioner at that time, and that if she failed to do so, her child support should 
be deducted from her lien upon the marital residence. This may be as much a finding about 
Respondent's character as it is a finding about her financial condition. 
The marital residence of the parties has nothing to do with alimony due Respondent, 
nor the retirement benefits of Petitioner, and is wholly irrelevant to the discussion at bar. 
The point the Johnson court made is that speculation is not what we want when we are 
deciding whether or not a change was "foreseeable" for purposes of modifying a decree of 
divorce. If it was foreseeable, it should have been stated specifically by the first trial court. 
This means that this Court should not have to read several sections of an old decree that may 
or may not be completely unrelated to one another, and extrapolate from them, in order to 
devine the intention of the court in making that order. 
POINT 3: THE LAW OF MODIFICATION DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THAT A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BE 
UNEXPECTED OR NOT CONTEMPLATED AT THE TIME 
OF DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
On page 15 of Appellee's Brief, Appellee goes to great length to state that there is an 
additional fact in the Bolliger case not found in the case at bar, that the husband was ordered 
to pay alimony based on his petition to modify the decree due to his "unexpected early 
retirement." Id. at 905. Respondent would have this Court believe that the foreseeability of 
Petitioner's desire to retire makes this case substantially distinguishable from Bolliger. 
However, what Respondent does not divulge to this Court is the fact that the husband in 
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Bolliger was forced to retire because of unexpected circumstances. Indeed, the trial court 
states specifically that "to succeed on a petition to modify a decree of divorce, the moving 
party must first show that a substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred" 
since the entry of decree of divorce and "not contemplated in the decree itself." Id. at 906, 
citing Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 716, 717 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
The key language in the above quote is the emphasized portion, "in the decree itself." 
The court in Bolliger relied upon this, as opposed to the retirement being "unexpected." Utah 
law allows for modifications in near-miss circumstances that can be reasonably expected, such 
as an individual who applies for a better job and feels confident that he might get that job. The 
fact that the individual did not unexpectedly seek and obtain better employment does not 
prevent his former spouse from petitioning to modify the decree of divorce based upon new 
income gained by her former spouse achieving new employment. Then, the Bolliger court 
goes on to state that: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial 
material change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their 
discussions does not mean that the decree itself contemplates 
the change. In order for a material change in circumstances to be 
contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that 
the trial court anticipated the specific change. 
Id. at 906, citing Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716. 
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft 
of any reference to the change to its circumstance at issue in the 
petition to modify, then the subsequent change to circumstance 
was not contemplated in the original decree. 
]d. The Bolliger case even goes a step further in referencing the standard laid out in Johnson, 
saying that "This Court noted that the trial court did not make findings regarding the plaintiffs 
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receipt of future income from the pension plan and how that would affect her need for 
alimony." ]d. at 907. Nowhere in the court's reasoning is the fact that the husband in Bolliger 
had an "unexpected early retirement" material to that court's decision. The standard laid out in 
Bolliger is bereft of anything that would indicate the Court here should deny a petition to 
modify simply because the retirement of a party is expected. 
The argument of Respondent and the lower court finding that the original trial court 
alimony award is "permanent," and thus should not be modified, is fundamentally flawed. It is 
worth noting that at the time of the parties' original Divorce Decree (1989), Utah Code 
Annotated, §30-3-5(8), had not been adopted stating that an award of alimony was generally 
limited by the number of years the parties had been married. Thus, it was common at that time 
forjudges to make awards of alimony "permanent" when what they really meant was that the 
facts merited awarding more than "temporary" alimony. (See Higlev v. Higlev, 626 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1983). 
Leading case law in this area is Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). As was 
stated in Jones, "the trial court has broad latitude in such matters [payment of alimony], and 
orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed." Id. at 1075, citing 
Higlev v. Higlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983); Dority v. Doritv, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982); 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
In Jones, the husband and wife had been married for twenty years during which time 
the wife had been primarily a stay-at-home wife and had developed a few marketable job skills. 
The husband worked and earned approximately $90,000.00 annually. The trial court entered 
an award of alimony granting the wife monthly alimony of $1,000.00 for five years, $750.00 for 
five additional years and $500.00 per month thereafter. The appellate court found that the trial 
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court had wholly failed to follow the standards as outlined in English v. English, 565 P.2d at 
411, in fixing a reasonable award of alimony. Those factors are as follows: (1) financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself; and (3) the ability of the husband to provide support. Id. at 411-12. Nowhere in that 
case does it mention the length of years of the marriage which was a substantive statutory 
provision. Further, the court, in Jones, found the arbitrary drops in alimony every five years to 
be an abuse of discretion when the court had failed to state a specific reason for doing so 
grounded in the facts of the case. Jones, at 1075. Therefore, when trial courts after 1985 
have made awards of alimony and stated that they were "permanent," they did not mean that 
the award of alimony was non-modifiable or non-reviewable. They simply meant that they had 
fixed no date certain upon which the alimony was to terminate, leaving that to the trial court to 
decide on a petition to modify, as was required by Jones. Thus, the Respondent's argument 
that the award of alimony is non-modifiable because it was called "permanent" is inaccurate 
and is not in keeping with Utah law in force at the time. Prior to the current enactment of Utah 
Code Annotated, §30-3-5(8), alimony of any limited number of years was called "temporary" 
alimony. See, generally, Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 
417 (Utah 1986); Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1990); and Higlev v. Higlev. 676 
P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
The Higlev case is particularly illustrative of Petitioner's point, as it involves both 
temporary and permanent alimony. In that case, the court stated as follows: 
The trial court in this action granted a divorce to each party, 
divided their property almost equally, awarded the appellant 
temporary alimony for three years in an amount equivalent to the 
house and utilities payments and awarded the appellant 
permanent alimony thereafter of $100 per month. The appellant 
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claims that the trial court abused its discretion in the granting of a 
divorce to Respondent and in the awarding of alimony. Her first 
argument is without merit, but we reverse and remand that 
portion of the decree dealing with alimony. This Court has set 
forth numerous criteria to be used in determining a reasonable 
alimony award. In light of our precedents and the absence of a 
specific finding regarding the appellant's present or future ability 
to work, the trial court's $100 per month permanent alimony 
award was, in our opinion, an abuse of discretion. Although we 
affirm the temporary alimony award, we reverse and remand the 
permanent alimony award for additional findings and possible 
modification. 
id. at 380. Respondent would have this Court believe that were the Higlev court to have also 
divided retirement assets, neither party could seek a modification of the alimony award after 
the retirement of either party simply because the court called the alimony award "permanent." 
In 1989, a trial judge could be summarily reversed for limiting the duration of alimony at 
111. 
POINT 4: NO REMAND IS NECESSARY FOR MORE 
SPECIFIC FINANCIAL FINDINGS. 
The Respondent relies primarily on the case of Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1999), in making her argument that the trial court should re-hear the matters of the parties' 
current financial situation. However, it is interesting to note that the Respondent goes on at 
great length to support Petitioner's argument that the alimony award should be terminated, in 
citing Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999) and Munns v. Munns, 790 
P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990), to show that there is sufficient basis to terminate the alimony 
award. The trial court here has previously made the finding that, were the Petitioner to retire, 
the Respondent would be better off financially. The trial court stated: 
[Respondent's] better off if [petitioner] retires, though. 
[Petitioner's counsel] is right. [Respondent] is going to qualify for 
social security, and that's going to happen whether he retires or 
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not, but her percentage of his retirement should be close to two 
and one-half, three times the amount of alimony that she receives 
under the alimony [sic]. So, if I show that they haven't shown a 
material change in circumstances and the petition is denied, and 
he chooses to continue working because of that, she's in worse 
shape than if he retires, even if they say he doesn't have to pay 
alimony anymore. The numbers can't be argued with. 
(ROT at 51, lines 5-14). Clearly, the judge was referencing specific financial information that 
was submitted by both parties in arriving at this determination, and had decided that the 
Respondent would not only be better off, but would be receiving two-and-one-half to three 
times more than what she was to receive under the status quo. 
Furthermore, the Respondent is taking the Moon case out of context when Respondent 
states that: "The trial court should consider evidence of the parties' financial situation, as their 
circumstances . . . may have changed during this Appeal." Id. at 438. The Appellate Court in 
that case was going to great length to emphasize that the trial court in Moon had failed wholly 
to give any findings in support of its ruling. What the court emphasized is that the parties, in 
Moon, needed to have their full financial status explored and analyzed by the trial court prior to 
making any award of alimony or denying any petition to modify alimony. The Court of Appeals, 
in Moon, would have remanded based on that lack of detailed findings regarding the finances 
alone, regardless of the amount of time that had passed while the case was waiting to be 
heard on appeal. 
What the Moon case really stands for is that the trial court must, even if it makes a 
finding of a substantial change in circumstances, consider what the parties' needs are, the 
ability to meet their needs, and the payor spouse's ability to pay, prior to making any order on 
alimony. It failed to do so in that case. 
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As Respondent states in her brief, "The Petitioner has not retired, Respondent has not 
applied for social security benefits, and the trial court itself notes in its Findings several times 
that it approximates the parties' future financial positions." (Brief of Appellee, at page 18). 
The Respondent essentially admits that there has been no material change in circumstances 
that was not considered by the court below at the trial appealed from. Further, the trial court 
was only "approximating" what the financial positions would be within days after the Petitioner 
retired, had the trial court allowed him to do so by granting his Petition to Modify. Petitioner 
would have retired at the conclusion of the trial; the Respondent would have applied for and 
received her benefits shortly thereafter; and she would have had more money. The trial court 
would not have been making an overly-speculative award based on a future event. 
Furthermore, both parties' counsel provided the trial court with completed and current financial 
declarations, tax returns and other financial information with which to make its decision. 
Further, no new determination should be allowed, as to do so would be the same as 
granting Respondent an untimely motion for a new trial regarding the parties' financial status. 
The trial court has clearly stated what its decision would be were it to find a substantial 
and material change in circumstances not contemplated in the original Decree, and this Court 
of Appeals should enter that judgment. No need for remand exists in this case. Both parties 
to this action have limited financial means with which to continue if this matter is remanded. 
This Court should enter judgment in favor of Petitioner, modifying the Decree of Divorce, 
terminating the alimony effective upon Petitioner's retirement. 
14 
POINT 5: RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS 
AND FEES ON THIS APPEAL BECAUSE 
PETITIONER'S APPEAL IS NECESSARY TO 
CORRECT THE CLEAR ERROR OF THE LOWER 
COURT. 
It is common Utah case law that a party who was awarded fees in a lower court and 
prevails on appeal should, likewise, be awarded fees on appeal. In Watson v. Watson, 837 
P.2d1, at 23-24: 
Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded below to 
the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded 
to that party on appeal. (Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quoting Burt, v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 
App. 1990)). In the case at bar, Mrs. Watson was awarded 
attorney fees below and has prevailed on appeal. Further, Mr. 
Watson has not demonstrated why we should diverge from the 
general rule; therefore, we award Mrs. Watson reasonable 
attorney fees in appeal. 
In the instant case, neither party was awarded attorney fees in the lower court, and, therefore, 
neither party should be awarded fees on appeal. The Respondent's argument that Petitioner 
should be ordered to pay Respondent's fees, because he has been unable to abide by the trial 
court's judgment, should be denied based upon the Respondent's need to have this matter 
reviewed on appeal. Clearly, the trial court in this case is not following the well-established 
Utah case law, and Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5. Therefore, Respondent should not be 
required to pay fees to have the decision corrected merely because the Respondent is alleging 
that Petitioner is failing to follow a court order which has been improperly entered. 
Further, the Respondent comes to this Court with unclean hands in her request for 
fees. Respondent, as pointed out in her brief, had a long history of consistently refusing to 
pay child support to Petitioner since the parties' divorce. Thus, her request for fees on appeal 
should be denied. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's original arguments for appeal stand unrefuted by the Respondent. This 
case is ripe for adjudication. 
No remand is necessary in this case, as the trial court has already determined that 
based upon its Findings and the review of all the financial information pertinent to this decision, 
the Respondent would be better off were the Petitioner to be allowed to retire and cease 
paying Respondent alimony. Respondent never appealed to this Court for a review of the trial 
court's financial findings and its determination that Respondent would be "better off" if 
Petitioner were allowed to retire. Therefore, this Court should find there has been a 
substantial and material change in circumstances and enter judgment granting Petitioner his 
Petition to Modify, terminating the alimony award to Respondent, effective upon Petitioner's 
retirement. 
Respondent was denied her fees from Petitioner at trial of the Petition to Modify and 
should, for reasons stated above, be denied her fees on appeal 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f; fa day^of July 
'CORPOR 
MAR* C. CO^ORON 
CRY CLI^E 
lARROD/tf. JENNINGS 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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Anita L. BARBER (Dumesnil), Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Eugene L. BARBER, Defendant and Appellee 
Case No. 880615-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
792 P.2d 134; 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 26; 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 86 
May 14, 1990, Filed 
[OR HISTORY: 
* 1 ] Third District, Salt Lake County; The Honorable Pat B. Brian. 
IE TERMS: furniture, divorce, separate property, termination, temporary alimony, replaced, 
abitation, alimony, bought, equitable division, clearly erroneous, premarital, personal property, property 
sion, marriage, married, decree, chair 
JNSEL: Richard L. Bird, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
nie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
GES: Richard C. Davidson, Judge. Norman H. Jackson, Judge, John Farr Larson, n l Judge, concur. 
ohn Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
NIONBY: DAVIDSON 
NION: [ * 1 3 5 ] Anita L. Barber appeals from the property division of her divorce from Eugene Barber 
from the court's termination of temporary alimony. We affirm. 
i and Eugene became acquainted in 1976. Anita owned a house at the t ime, which had been awarded 
»r in an earlier divorce. In December 1976, Eugene and his children moved into the house with Anita. 
>out that t ime, Eugene finished the basement and constructed a patio deck with the help of Anita's 
. He also improved the landscaping and bought some new furniture, some of which replaced part of 
I'S furniture. There was no discussion between the parties about their legal rights in relation to these 
Dvements, although at one point after the improvements were made, Anita refused to put the house in 
tenancy. 
jghout [ * * 2 ] the parties' relationship, the greater part of the household expenses, including the 
\ mortgage, were paid by Eugene. Anita has relatively few employment skills and little work 
ience. She was employed at the t ime of t r ia l , but only occasionally during the marriage did she work 
je the home. She received alimony from her prior husband until 1978, and she also received child 
Drt for her children. 
living together for about two years, Anita and Eugene were married in November 1978. They had no 
en from their union, but both had children from their prior marriages. They separated in August 1983, 
,nita began living with another man. Despite a rather heated evidentiary dispute about when this 
Mtation began, some evidence indicated, and the trial court found, that it began in the fall of 1983. 
Anita filed for divorce in May 1984. The case was tried in March 1985, but Eugene failed to appear. The 
court nevertheless heard testimony from Anita, granted a divorce, awarded temporary alimony, and 
reserved the issues of permanent alimony, property, and attorney fees. A subsequent evidentiary hearing 
was held in 1987, after which Anita moved to again reopen and introduce [ * * 3 ] evidence of the parties' 
financial condition, but her motion was denied. After lengthy disputation over the details of the findings, the 
wording of the decree, and the specifics of the personal property [ * 1 3 6 ] distribution, a decree was finally 
entered. Anita appeals. 
Anita's principal n2 arguments on appeal are: (1) the improvements to her home by her then husband-to-
be became her separate property, and the trial court could not equitably divide that property in the later 
divorce; (2) the property division is inequitable because it fails to take into consideration the fact that the 
furniture Eugene bought replaced equivalent furniture of Anita's; and (3) the final decree terminates 
temporary alimony prematurely. 
Footnotes 
n2 Anita included in her brief additional arguments on evidence, unfair prejudice by the trial judge, and 
other matters. These arguments clearly lack merit and do not warrant discussion in this opinion. See State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989). 
End Footnotes 
Anita's first argument is premised on holdings in cases [ * * 4 ] such as Lavton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which we 
concluded that, under pre-1987 law, n3 the property of unmarried cohabitants is not subject to equitable 
distribution as in cases of divorce. However, Anita's argument completely ignores the fact that these parties 
were eventually married, and it is well-settled that premarital or separate property may, under proper 
circumstances, be subject to equitable division upon divorce. n4 Anita also fails to show how the 
improvements that Eugene made to the house became her separate property. Anita clearly does not 
establish the essential premises of her reliance on Layton and Mattes. 
Footnotes 
n3 For current law, see Utah Code Ann. 5 30-1-4.5 (1989). 
n4 Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988); Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Peterson v. Peterson, IAS P.2d 593, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
End Footnotes 
[ * * 5 ] In relation to the division of personal property, Anita notes that Eugene replaced furniture that was 
originally hers with new furniture. Anita then argues that the new furniture should be treated as her 
separate, premarital property because it replaced old furniture that was her separate property. No legal 
theory has been suggested to us to justify holding that a chair bought by Eugene becomes Anita's separate 
property due to the fact that it now stands where a chair owned by Anita once stood. Moreover, even if the 
replaced furniture had become Anita's separate property, it would nevertheless be subject to equitable 
division upon divorce, as we have noted above. 
Finally, Anita questions the termination of temporary alimony. Judge Brian apparently based that 
termination on his finding that Anita was cohabiting with another man. Neither of the parties seriously 
disputes that, under Utah law, cohabitation warrants termination of alimony. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(6) (1989). Rather, Anita's attack on the termination of alimony is simply an attack on the finding of 
cohabitation. However, in that attack, she wholly [ * * 6 ] fails to take into account our standard of review. 
We do not reverse a trial court's finding of fact unless the appellant marshals all evidence relevant to the 
finding and then shows the finding to be clearly erroneous. n5 Anita has neither marshaled the relevant 
evidence nor shown the finding to be clearly erroneous. We therefore uphold the termination of temporary 
alimony. 
Footnotes 
In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). 
End Footnotes 
ta's arguments on which this appeal is based are thus without merit. This was a frivolous appeal. n6 In 
:h a case, we may award double costs to the appellee. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
Footnotes 
Utah R. App. P. 33(b); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Porco v. Porco, 752 
d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); cf. Mauohan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
End Footnotes 
*7 ] Affirmed, but remanded for taxing, under Utah R. App. P. 34, of twice the amount of costs incurred 
appeal. 
man H. Jackson, Judge, John Farr Larson, Judge, concur. 
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Rainer Frederick HUCK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Patricia Ann HUCK, Defendant and Respondent 
No.19180 
Supreme Court of Utah 
734 P.2d 417; 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; 1986 Utah LEXIS 911 
November 4 , 1986, Filed 
CASE SUMMARY 
OCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff husband filed for divorce from defendant wife. The district court 
ah) invalidated the parties' prenuptial agreement and awarded the wife temporary support, 
tody of the parties' child, child support, and attorney fees. The husband appealed. 
ERVIEW: During the parties' marriage, the wife's compensation from her employment was used 
>ay household expenses. During the marriage, the husband acquired rental properties, which he 
chased with his own funds. In invalidating the prenuptial agreement, the district court found that 
wife was coerced into signing it because she was already pregnant and the wedding had already 
n planned. The husband argued that he was prejudiced by the invalidation of the prenuptial 
cement, as the wife had waived child support and alimony so long as she was capable of self-
port at the t ime of the divorce. In affirming the decree, the court held that the prenuptial 
cement was properly invalidated, as it only attempted to limit child support if the parties divorced 
lin two years; the parties divorced within four years of marriage, and the wife could not have 
/ed the child's unalienable right to support. The court also held that the several rental properties 
were acquired after the marriage were properly awarded to the wife, as they were marital 
>erty because they could not have been acquired by the husband without the wife's contribution 
ards household expenses. 
TCOME: The court affirmed the decree that had been entered for the wife in the husband's divorce 
>n. 
IE TERMS: marriage, prenuptial, divorce, child support, temporary alimony, rental properties, self-
lort, signing, alimony, separate property, decree, household, wedding, voiding, coerced, presented 
2nce, financial need, estopped, binding, division of property, personal property, personal expenses, 
erty acquired, marital property, ordered to pay, medical care, gross income, full credit, child care, 
idiced 
CORE CONCEPTS - • Hide Concepts 
mily Law : Child Support : Collection & Enforcement 
miiy Law : Marital Duties & Rights : Premarital Agreements 
agreement between spouses can act to deprive a child of the basic and unalienable right to child 
>port since such right is vested in the minor. 
Tiily Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Collection & Enforcement 
ni lv Law : Marital Duties & Rights : Premarital Agreements 
agreement or stipulation between the parties as to alimony is not binding on the court but 
serves only as a recommendation; it is within the court's power to modify such an agreement or 
stipulation at the t ime of the decree or subsequently. 
I ] Family Law : Child Support : Collection & Enforcement 
H Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Collection & Enforcement 
j ] Family Law : Marital Duties £ Rights : Premarital Agreements 
i l n general, prenuptial agreements concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at 
the time of their marriage are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. 
However, provisions eliminating the payment of child support or alimony in prenuptial agreements 
are not binding on the court. This judicial discretion allows the parties freedom of contract while 
preserving the right of the state to insure adequate support for its citizens. 
H Civil Procedure : Costs & Attorney Fees : Attorney Fees 
L i ] Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support 
± I n divorce cases, an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is reasonable in 
amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting the award. 
Ml Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Collection Sk Enforcement 
IB Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Property Distribution 
±Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953) provides that the court may make such orders in relation to the 
children, property, and parties as may be equitable. 
COUNSEL: [ * * 1 ] 
Craig Cook for Plaintiff. 
Roger Sandack for Defendant. 
JUDGES: Howe, Justice. Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. 
Zimmerman, Justice. Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
OPINIONBY: HOWE 
O P I N I O N : [ * 4 1 8 ] Plaintiff appeals the property division and award of temporary support and attorney 
fees made in this divorce case. 
The plaintiff, Rainer Huck, and the defendant, Patricia Huck, met and began dating in 1972 while doing 
graduate work at the University of Utah. During the course of their relationship, defendant became 
pregnant. Plaintiff suggested that she have an abortion. Defendant, however, wanted to marry plaintiff and 
give birth to the child. Plaintiff, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to the marriage, and plans were made for a 
wedding in April of 1975. On April 9, one day prior to the wedding, the parties signed a prenuptial 
agreement containing the following provisions: 
1. All property owned by either party prior to the marriage shall remain the exclusive property 
and province of such person . . . . 
2. [Sets out specific property of each brought into the marriage.] 
3 [A] mutual agreement as to the disbursement of [ * * 2 ] property acquired after the 
marriage shall be made by the parties themselves or in the event they cannot agree, that they 
shall allow a court of law to divide such property . . . . 
4 Should divorce or legal separation proceedings be filed within two years from the 
undersigned date, Pat shall totally support any children . . . . provided, however, that in the 
event Pat is unable to support said children from her own income Rainer will assume all 
responsibility and child support, even though any children remain in Pat's custody. 
5. It is mutually agreed that neither party shall be responsible or liable for the other party's 
debts or obligations existing prior to marriage. 
6. In the event of divorce or separation Pat specifically waives any alimony or support 
payments provided that she is capable of self-support at such t ime. 
7 This document shall be interpreted under Utah Law . . . . 
8 I f such marriage does not take place then this agreement shall be null and void. 
9. The parties hereby acknowledge that each of them has been represented by counsel of their 
choice and has been advised of their rights and liabilities . . . . [ * * 3 ] 
ring the marriage, defendant worked and attended school. She paid most of the household expenses, 
>d, medical care and insurance, as well as child care and her own personal expenses. Plaintiff provided 
\ house they lived in and paid the taxes thereon and the utilities except for electricity, which defendant 
d. He managed the rental properties he had acquired before the marriage and seven additional 
>perties he acquired during the marriage. The property at 224 Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, was acquired 
funds contributed by both plaintiff and defendant, and tit le was taken as tenants in common. All other 
iperties acquired during the marriage were either obtained by funds generated from the rental properties 
d title taken in plaintiffs name alone) or purchased joint ly by plaintiff and his attorney. 
^pril 1979, plaintiff filed for divorce. Defendant received temporary child support of $175 per month and 
nporarv alimony of $75 per month during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court 
alidated the prenuptial agreement, finding that defendant had been coerced into signing it. Defendant 
> awarded custody of their daughter, Sophy, and child support [ * * 4 ] of $200 a month. Along with her 
arate personal property, she was also awarded real property located at 224 and 215 Iowa Street and 
> Harmony Street in [ * 4 1 9 ] Salt Lake City, all of which were acquired during the marriage. Plaintiff 
; ordered to pay defendant's attorney fees in the amount of $2,750. Plaintiff appeals, raising the 
)wing issues: 
ID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT VOID? 
trial court found that defendant was coerced into signing the prenuptial agreement because she was 
ady pregnant and plans for the wedding had been made when she was asked to sign. However, the 
rt also found that invalidating the prenuptial agreement did not prejudice plaintiff. He contends that he 
prejudiced by the voiding of the prenuptial agreement in that he was ordered to pay child support and 
iporary alimony, which defendant had waived in the agreement as long as she was capable of self-
Dort at the time of a divorce. Because defendant had a gross income of $1,140 per month at the time of 
divorce, plaintiff contends that the court should have found her capable of self-support and that the 
re to do so, coupled [ * * 5 ] with the voiding of the prenuptial agreement, prejudiced him in the 
unt of child support and temporary alimony he was required to pay. 
agreement only attempted to limit defendant's right to child support in the event that divorce 
eedings were filed within two years of the signing of the agreement. The agreement was signed April 9, 
5; plaintiff filed for divorce in April of 1979, four years later. Therefore, even had the agreement been 
reed by the trial court, it would not have had any effect on child support. In any event, + no agreement 
ieen the spouses could act to deprive the child of "the basic and unalienable right to child support, 
i such right is vested in the minor." Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982). See Strong v, 
IQ, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976). 
) temporary alimony, defendant waived her right to alimony in the agreement, "provided she was 
ble of self-support" at the time of the divorce. Defendant presented evidence that her expenses 
eded her income by $700. Thus, even under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, the trial court 
I have properly awarded temporary alimony. ^An agreement or stipulation between the nartipc 
[ * * 6 ] as to alimony is not binding on the court, but serves only as a recommendation; it is within the 
court's power to modify such an agreement or stipulation at the time of the decree or subsequently. 
CaHister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 37, 261 P.2d 944, 946 (1953). 
Plaintiff does not claim that any other term of the agreement was unsatisfied or that he suffered any other 
prejudice by the court's failure to enforce the prenuptial agreement. This Court need not reach the issue of 
whether defendant was coerced into signing the agreement, since even if the trial court erred in so finding, 
the error was not prejudicial. 
Although the validity of the agreement is not dispositive in this case, it should be noted that T in general, 
prenuptial agreements concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at the time of their 
marriage are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. However, provisions 
eliminating the payment of child support or alimony in prenuptial agreements are not binding on the court. 
This judicial discretion allows the parties freedom of contract while preserving the right of the state to 
insure adequate support for its citizens. [ * * 7 ] Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719, 722 
(1973). 
I I . DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES? 
T in divorce cases, an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is reasonable in 
amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting the award. Beals v. Beats, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1984). Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence to support a finding of financial need on the part of 
defendant to justify the award of fees to defendant. He presented evidence that her total income from all 
[ * 4 2 0 ] sources, including support payments, totalled $1,795 per month and that therefore she should be 
capable of bearing the cost of l i t igation. 
However, defendant had no liquid assets, and even using plaintiffs figures as to her gross income from all 
sources, her income barely covered her expenses. Her attorney testified at trial as to the reasonableness of 
the time spent and fees charged. The trial court awarded her less than one-third of the amount she sought. 
She met her burden of showing financial need and provided evidence that the fees assessed to plaintiff 
($2,750) were reasonable. 
I I I . DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY [ * * 8 ] ACQUIRED DURING THE 
MARRIAGE TO DEFENDANT? 
Plaintiff contends that all properties acquired during the marriage (except 224 Iowa Street) should be 
deemed his "separate property" and that defendant should be estopped from claiming any interest in 215 
Iowa Street and 629 Harmony Street, which were awarded to her. + U.C.A., 1953, 5 30-3-5 provides that 
the court may make "such orders in relation to the children, property and parties . . . . as may be 
equitable." 
Plaintiff's attempt to classify all properties acquired during the marriage as his separate property is of no 
avail. The fact that t it le was not in their jo int names and that the properties were purchased with funds 
generated from his other rental properties is not determinative of the distribution to be made. 
The trial court properly looked to the contributions of the parties during the marriage. Plaintiff's only 
income was derived from the rental properties he owned and managed. Defendant, though attending 
school, was employed and paid most of the household expenses, food, medical care, and insurance, as well 
as child care and her own personal expenses. While plaintiff used his income to acquire additional 
properties, defendant's [ * * 9 ] funds were consumed in supporting the parties and their child. The trial 
court was correct in holding that the properties were marital property that could not have been acquired by 
plaintiff without defendant's contribution toward household expenses. 
The voiding of the prenuptial agreement did not in any way affect the division of property made by the 
court. As per the terms of the agreement, plaintiff was awarded all real properties he owned prior to the 
marriage. He also received the increase in value of those properties from amounts expended during the 
marriage to improve them and reduce or retire mortgages. Plaintiff's argument that all properties acquired 
during the marriage should be considered his separate property because the down payments came from his 
separate funds is not persuasive. The prenuptial agreement provided that property acquired during the 
jrriage should be divided by the court. The three properties awarded to defendant were acquired during 
> marriage. However, plaintiff was given full credit for the cash and personal property he brought into the 
irriage in the sum of $15,000, part of which ($3,000) he used as a down payment on the 629 Harmony 
•eet property. [ * * 1 0 ] The decree awarded him $19,000 in cash from the sale proceeds of the Harvard 
eet property which the parties sold prior to their separation, $1,600 from the sale of a boat, and a 
r000 note, in addition to his car, motorcycles, and laboratory equipment. In addition to giving plaintiff full 
dit for his premarital $15,000, the court awarded him the long half of the marital property. The division 
property properly considered the contribution of the parties and the needs they will have in adjusting to 
;ir new situation. 
ire is no merit to plaintiffs contention that defendant should be estopped from claiming any interest in 
properties acquired during the marriage. Plaintiff points to several occasions when defendant stated she 
nted nothing to do with the properties and claimed no interest therein. However, since the prenuptial 
eement clearly gave her an interest, plaintiff could [ * 4 2 1 ] not have reasonably relied on her 
tuitous oral disclaimers. 
:ree affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice. 
wart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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CASE SUMMARY 
)CEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff wife filed a divorce proceeding against defendant husband. The 
court (Utah) distributed the property and awarded temporary alimony. The wife appealed. 
•RVIEW: Throughout the marriage, the wife did not work, but she cared for the parties' six 
Iren. Although the husband had a history of earning good income, he was without a job at the 
; of the tr ial . In a post-trial proceeding, the trial court sua sponte raised the issue of whether 
ony should only be temporary and ordered that the award terminate after 2 years. First, the wife 
ed that the amount of alimony awarded was insufficient, as it did not reflect the husband's 
>rical earnings. In affirming the decree, the court held that the trial court's consideration of the 
>and's past income was evidenced by the fact that alimony and child support were awarded 
•ite the fact that the husband was without income. Secondly, the wife argued that the trial court 
j in awarding temporary rather than permanent alimony. The court modified the decree, finding 
the temporary al imony award was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Because the wife 
not worked since the birth of her first child, it was unreasonable to believe that she would have 
d work sufficient to support herself and her remaining three children within two years of the 
5e. 
COME: In the wife's divorce proceeding against the husband, the court modified the divorce 
*e to provide for permanent alimony and affirmed the decree as modified. 
E TERMS: alimony, marriage, earning, financial condition, decree of divorce, decree, consulting 
less, standard of l iving, earning capacity, t ime of tr ial , abuse of discretion, permanent alimony, living 
nses, minor children, current income, alimony award, consulting, modified, divorce, enjoyed, modify, 
dicial abuse of discretion, equitable, continuing jurisdiction, financial declaration, retirement account, 
y to support, ability to provide, minimum wage, high school 
CORE CONCEPTS - • Hide Concepts 
11 Procedure : Appeals : Standards of Review : Abuse of Discretion 
Tiily Law : Child Support : Collection & Enforcement 
nily Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
nily Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Property Distribution 
jranting a divorce, the trial court may make such orders in relation to the children, property, and 
ties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties and children, as may be equitable. Utah 
le Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984).The reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's distribution of 
perty and award of alimony in a divorce proceeding absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
retion. 
U Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i A n alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
In determining the amount of alimony to be awarded, it was necessary for the trial court to consider 
the financial condition and needs of the plaintiff, her ability to produce a sufficient income for 
herself, and the ability of the defendant to provide support. 
I l l Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i W h e r e the husband has experienced a temporary decrease in income, his historical earnings must 
be taken into account in determining the amount of alimony to be paid. 
COUNSEL: [ * * 1 ] 
John G. Marshall, Salt Lake City; Kenton W. Willis, Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff. 
Mary Lou Godbe, Salt Lake City, for Defendant. 
JUDGES: Hall, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. We concur: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe, 
Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice. 
OPINIONBY: HALL 
O P I N I O N : [ * 5 6 5 ] Linda M. Olson, plaintiff, appeals from the property distribution and alimony 
provisions of a decree of divorce. She contends the trial court erred in awarding an insufficient amount of 
alimony, in ordering that alimony terminate after two years, and in failing to treat defendant's earning 
capacity as an asset in dividing the marital property. We reject the contentions regarding the property 
division and the amount of alimony, but hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award 
permanent alimony. Thus, we modify the decree to provide for permanent alimony, as further explained 
below, and affirm the decree as modified. 
The parties were married in December 1960. The decree of divorce was entered in May 1983, after the 
parties had been separated about two years. They had six children, three of whom were minors, aged 16, 
11 , and 3, [ * * 2 ] at the t ime of the divorce. 
At the t ime of the marriage, the plaintiff was eighteen and worked as a typist, having recently graduated 
from high school. Six months after the marriage, she quit her job because of pregnancy. She was not again 
employed outside the home until after the parties separated, when she worked for minimum wage as a 
part-t ime, temporary department store clerk during the Christmas season. 
The defendant worked and supported the family during the marriage. He formed a consulting business and 
provided consulting services to governmental agencies on a contract basis. His income fluctuated 
depending on his current contracts. His gross income was $76,485 in 1980, $62,603 in 1981, and $57,000 
for the first nine months of 1982. At the t ime of t r ia l , the defendant had no consulting contracts in force 
and no current income. He was negotiating a contract, which he expected to obtain, that would bring 
$3,500 a month for the remainder of 1982. 
During the marriage, the parties acquired a home, in which their equity at the t ime of trial was $137,000 
according to the plaintif fs estimate and $206,000 according to the defendant's estimate. The defendant 
also acquired [ * * 3 ] a retirement account during the marriage worth $15,359 at the t ime of tr ial. 
The plaintiff filed a financial declaration showing monthly living expenses of $5,500 for the entire family 
before the separation. She estimated the future living expenses for herself and the three minor children to 
be $4,200 per month. The defendant filed a financial declaration showing his monthly expenses to be 
$2,837. 
After tr ial, the trial court issued a memorandum decision providing, among other things, that the defendant 
pay the plaintiff $1,600 per month as alimony. In a post-trial proceeding, the court sua sponte raised the 
ue whether the alimony should be paid for only a limited t ime. The court rejected the suggestion of the 
Pendant's counsel that alimony be paid for ten years. Suggesting instead a term of two years, the court 
ted: 
I think she's got to get out and take care of herself. She just cannot sit back and get $1,600 a 
month from this fellow and do nothing to help support herself. Society doesn't tolerate that 
from any of us. That's why we are all employed. And she has just the same obligations to take 
care of herself as we all have. [ * 5 6 6 ] 
2 decree [ * * 4 ] of divorce granted to the plaintiff alimony of $1,600 per month for a period of two 
irs. The decree granted custody of the three minor children to the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to 
f $200 per month per child as child support. The decree awarded each party one-half the equity in the 
ne, payable upon sale of the home, and ordered that the home be sold when the oldest child in the 
intiff's custody reached eighteen years of age or when the plaintiff cohabited or remarried, whichever 
urred first. Each party was awarded an automobile and his or her personal effects. The plaintiff was 
arded the contents of the home. The defendant was awarded his consulting business, his retirement 
ount and a gymnasium membership. 
\ granting a divorce, the trial court may make "such orders in relation to the children, property and 
ties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties and children, as may be equitable." U.C.A., 
>3, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). This Court will not disturb the trial court's distribution of property and award of 
iony in a divorce proceeding absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, n l 
Footnotes 
Hialev v. Hialev, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (1983); Doritv v. Doritv, Utah, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982) 
ations omitted); English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). 
End Footnotes [**5] 
ressing first the plaintiff's challenge to the amount of alimony awarded, we find no abuse of discretion. 
\ alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
ntain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. n2 In 
jrmining the amount of alimony to be awarded, it was necessary for the trial court to consider the 
ncial condition and needs of the plaintiff, her ability to produce a sufficient income for herself, and the 
ty of the defendant to provide support. n3 
Footnotes 
•HcileVr supra note 1 , at 3 8 1 ; English, supra note 1 at 4 1 1 . 
>ee Jones v, Jones, Utah f 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1985); Higley, supra note 1 , at 381 (citation omitted); 
Vs/7, supra note 1 at 411-12 (footnote omitted). 
End Footnotes 
plaintiff contends the trial court failed to consider these factors in setting the amount of alimony in this 
. More specifically, she asserts the trial court failed to consider the defendant's [ * * 6 ] ability to 
ide support as shown by his historical earnings rather than his current income. 
lave held that *where the husband has experienced a temporary decrease in income, his historical 
ings must be taken into account in determining the amount of alimony to be paid. n4 Contrary to the 
stiff's contention here, however, the record reflects the trial court's consideration of the defendant's 
>rical earnings in setting the amount of alimony. In comparison to the defendant's earnings at the time 
ial, the amount of support awarded itself reflects a consideration of the defendant's past earnings: 
ite the defendant's total lack of current income, the court ordered him to pay $1,600 per month in 
Dny and $2,200 per month in total family maintenance. Moreover, the court's findings of fact include 
determinations of the defendant's past earnings, again showing a consideration of this factor. 
Footnotes 
n4 English, supra note 1, at 412; Westenskow v. Westenskow, Utah, 562 P.2d 1256, 1257 (1977). 
End Footnotes [**7] 
The plaintiff next argues that the trial court did not consider the realistic limitations on her earning ability in 
establishing the amount of alimony. To the contrary, the findings of fact reflect that the court analyzed the 
plaintiff's current ability to support herself and found it very limited, The findings state that "plaintiff is in 
need of alimony to maintain and support herself as she is not working, has been able to secure only 
minimum wage jobs and testified that because of her emotional state and her parental duties for her 
children, she could not currently maintain any employment." 
Clearly, then, the trial court considered both the second and third factors in the above three-part analysis 
in determining [ * 5 6 7 ] the amount of alimony in this case. The record contains only scant indication, 
however, of the court's consideration of the first of the three factors, the financial condition and needs of 
the wife. The findings of fact contain only the conclusory finding that "plaintiff is in need of alimony," and, 
in a discussion on the record, the court generally described the parties' jo int financial condition as an 
"economic disaster." 
Turning to the record in the [ * * 8 ] absence of sufficient findings, we find conflicting evidence on some 
factual issues material to a determination of the wife's financial condition and needs. Nevertheless, even 
accepting as true, for purposes of review, the wife's evidence on these issues, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the amount of alimony awarded. The undisputed facts, taken with the plaintiffs evidence on 
disputed facts, establish that the plaintif fs only substantial asset is her share of the equity in the marital 
home, worth about $68,500, and that, to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage, 
the living expenses of the wife and the three minor children would be $4,200 per month. 
Considering the plaintiff's financial condition and needs, as established by the evidence most favorable to 
her, in conjunction with her ability to support herself and the defendant's ability to provide support, as 
found by the trial court, the award of $1,600 per month in alimony was within the court's sound discretion. 
While the alimony award was far below the total amount required to maintain the wife at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, it is reasonable in light of the limited [ * * 9 ] family resources 
available to fulfill her needs. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion. Should the relevant circumstances 
change in the future, the wife may petition the court for modification of the amount of alimony under the 
court's continuing jurisdict ion. n5 
Footnotes 
n5 See, U.C.A., 1953, 5 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). 
End Footnotes 
We agree, however, with the plaintiff's contention that the court's order that alimony terminate after two 
years was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. As we stated in Jones v. Jones, n6 "this is simply not 
the sort of situation in which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony award is appropriate." n7 Married soon 
after graduating from high school, the plaintif fs primary occupation during the twenty-odd year marriage, 
was caring for the parties' home and six children. Having worked only minor clerical jobs for two brief 
periods over twenty years apart, she has no reasonable expectation of obtaining employment two years 
hence that will enable her to support herself at a standard of living even [ * * 1 0 ] approaching that which 
she had during the marriage. n8 Continuing spousal maintenance is mandated by these circumstances. 
Therefore, under our discretionary power to modify the final decree in a divorce action, n9 we hereby 
modify the decree of divorce in this case to provide for permanent alimony from defendant to plaintiff. 
Again, should the circumstances change in the future, the defendant may petition the court to modify the 
decree under its continuing jurisdiction. nlO 
Footnotes 
Supra note 3. 
Id. at 1076. 
See id. 
Hialev, supra note 1 at 382; Read v. Read, Utah, 594 P.2d 871, 873 (1979V 
See, supra note 5. 
. End Footnotes 
illy, the plaintiff challenges the property distribution on the ground that she was not awarded either a 
re of the present value of the defendant's earning capacity, or additional property in compensation for 
award of the defendant's consulting business to him. 
award of alimony, as modified by this opinion, duly considers and in fact is [ * *11 ] based upon the 
ling capacity of the defendant which clearly equates with his ability to pay alimony. No evidence was 
jced at trial to establish any value attributable to the consulting business, and plaintiff concedes that 
award of the [ *568] business to defendant was proper because the value of the business consists 
of defendant's personal ability to perform consulting services. 
earning capacity of the defendant having been fully considered and taken into account in arriving at an 
table divorce settlement, we affirm the decree of divorce, except as to the provision for alimony 
ified by this opinion. 
CONCUR: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. 
nerman, Justice. 
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676 P.2d 379; 1983 Utah LEXIS 1231 
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CASE SUMMARY 
tCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant wife sought review of the decision from the trial court (Utah), 
:h granted a divorce to appellee husband and the wife, divided their property almost equally, and 
rded the wife temporary alimony for three years and a reduced amount as permanent alimony, 
wife contented that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony. 
RVIEW: The parties were granted a divorce. The trial court divided their property almost equally, 
rded the wife temporary alimony for three years and awarded her permanent alimony of $ 100 
}nth thereafter. The wife claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony, 
sal, the court affirmed the trial court's temporary alimony award but reversed its award of 
lanent alimony. The court held that: (1) where the wife had no present or prospective permanent 
ne other than the $ 100 per month permanent alimony award, her living expenses exceeded $ 
per month, she was 47 years old and in very poor health, and she spent most of the prior 30 
s as a full-t ime homemaker and caretaker of five children, the trial court's award fell far short of 
iding the wife a standard of living approximating that which she enjoyed during the marriage; (2) 
i the foregoing considerations, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make findings 
rding the wife's ability to work; and (3) because the record was inadequate for the court to 
ify the decree, it was necessary to remand the alimony award for additional findings and possible 
ification. 
COME: The court affirmed the trial court's award of temporary al imony but reversed its award 
irmanent alimony. The court held that the absence of a specific finding regarding the wife's 
2nt or future ability to work, the trial court's $ 100 per month permanent alimony award was an 
e of discretion. The court remanded the permanent alimony award for additional findings and 
ible modifications. 
E TERMS: ability to work, permanent alimony, alimony award, marriage, alimony, welding, earning, 
age, stomach, standard of living, temporary alimony, modification, divorce, enjoyed, decree, woman, 
dicial abuse of discretion, support and maintenance, divorce proceeding, sufficient income, mental 
h, high school, set for th, self-supporting, contributed, three-year, rebuild, modify, career, outlet 
CORE CONCEPTS - • Hide Concepts 
Tiily Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i criteria in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance include the financial 
ditions and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; 
I the ability of the husband to provide support. 
nily Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i .An alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living 
and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
El Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i A n appellate court will not disturb the trial court's distribution of property and award of alimony in a 
divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown. 
Hi Civil Procedure : Appeals : Standards of Review : Abuse of Discretion 
B) Family Law : Divorce, Dissolution & Spousal Support : Obligations 
i W h e n an appellate court determines that a trial court's alimony award is a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion, the appellate court may either make a modification in the decree or remand for 
entry of a modified judgment by the trial court. Utah Const, art. V I I I , § 9. 
COUNSEL: [ * * 1 ] 
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, Utah, for Plaintiff. 
Darrell G. Renstrom, Ogden, Utah, for Defendant. 
JUDGES: Durham, Justice, wrote the opinion. I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Dallin H. Oaks, Justice, Richard C. 
Howe, Justice, concur. Hall, Chief Justice, dissents by separate opinion. 
OPINIONBY: DURHAM 
O P I N I O N : [ * 3 8 0 ] The trial court in this action granted a divorce to each party, divided their property 
almost equally, awarded the appellant temporary alimony for three years in an amount equivalent to the 
house and utilities payments and awarded the appellant permanent alimony thereafter of $100 per month. 
The appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in the granting of a divorce to respondent and 
in the awarding of alimony. Her first argument is without merit, but we reverse and remand that portion of 
the decree dealing with alimony. This Court has set forth numerous criteria to be used in determining a 
reasonable alimony award. In light of our precedents and the absence of a specific finding regarding the 
appellant's present or future ability to work, the trial court's $100 per month permanent alimony award 
was, in our opinion, an abuse of discretion. Although we affirm [ * * 2 ] the temporary alimony award, we 
reverse and remand the permanent alimony award for additional findings and possible modification. 
In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), this Court set forth fifteen factors that 
may be considered in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties in a divorce proceeding. In light of 
these factors, the relevant facts in the present case are as follows: The parties began their 30-year 
marriage when the respondent was 19 and the appellant was 17. The respondent has an eleventh-grade 
education, and his income is approximately $1,200 (net) per month plus potential income from occasional 
welding jobs. The appellant has a high school degree and no income. Their property consists of $62,200 
equity in a home valued at $69,500, welding equipment worth $4,000, several older model motor vehicles 
and household furnishings and effects. This property was acquired through their jo int efforts. The 
respondent contributed his income and his labor, and the appellant contributed her labor. She helped build 
and run the respondent's private welding business, and her homemaking and childrearing efforts facilitated 
the respondent's pursuit [ * * 3 ] of his career. The five children of the parties are all adults now and, 
although two still live with their mother, they are all self-supporting. At his current age of 49, the 
respondent is in good physical and mental health. Although the 47-year-old appellant is in good mental 
health, her physical health is very poor. In 1972, she had an operation for pyloric gastrectomy and hiatal 
hernia [ * 3 8 1 ] necessitating the removal of three-fourths of her stomach. In 1973, she had a 
hysterectomy due to hemorrhaging and potassium shock. In 1975, she underwent an operation to remove 
blockage and to rebuild the outlet to her stomach. Eighteen days later another operation for intestinal 
blockage was performed. At the present t ime, she is in need of further surgery for blockage and to rebuild 
the outlet to her stomach. In the future, she may need a series of further operations for similar problems. 
Both parties were satisfied with their marriage for many years, but the divorce came about when the 
)ondent became unhappy with the marriage and became involved with another woman. Both parties 
Je sacrifices during the marriage. The respondent worked two jobs to provide for his family, [ * * 4 ] 
le the appellant managed the home and cared for their children, thereby foregoing employment 
erience and benefits. The record indicates both parties have approximately equal living expenses of 
ut $800 per month, and these amounts would be sufficient to maintain each of them at approximately 
standard of living they enjoyed during their marriage. 
i respect to alimony and child support, this Court has stated that the 
? " . . . . criteria in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance include the 
financial conditions and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income 
for herself; and the ability of the husband to provide support. 
fish v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 411-412 (1977) (footnote omitted). In the present case, the 
sllant has no present or prospective permanent income other than the $100 per month permanent 
ony award, whereas her living expenses exceed $800 per month. She is a 47-year-old woman in very 
- health, who has spent most of the last 30 years of her life as a full-t ime homemaker and caretaker of 
children. Her efforts as homemaker have enabled the respondent to build [ * * 5 ] a career as an 
-aft welder. I t is highly unlikely that the appellant will be able to produce sufficient income for herself, 
has no employment training or experience other than a few sporadic, seasonal, unskilled jobs. Given 
health problems, it is questionable whether she will be able to obtain and maintain full-t ime 
loyment. Even if she does find work her earning potential is very low. The following statistics provide 
jht into the economic reality of the appellant's situation: In 1981, the median income for a woman in 
United States with a high school education was $6,495 per year. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
artment of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Series P-60 No. 137, Money Income of Households, 
Hies, and Persons in the United States: 1981, Table 37 (Washington, D.C., 1983). Another study 
als that, overall, women's earnings in the United States average $ .59 for every $1 earned by men. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Report 673, The Female - Male Earnings Gap: A 
ew of Employment and Earnings Issues, Table 6 (Washington, D.C., September, 1982). Moreover, 
luse the appellant has no [ * * 6 ] previous work history her projected earnings may in fact be even 
r than the above figures. This is in striking contrast to the respondent's annual gross income of 
356.80, which he can supplement with additional income from his welding business. Certainly the 
ondent has the ability to provide permanent support for the appellant in an amount greater than $100 
nonth should her needs so warrant. 
alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
itain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Given 
;mall amount of income that the appellant realistically will be able to earn, the $100 per month alimony 
d will not afford her a standard of living anywhere near that which she enjoyed during the marriage or 
that of the respondent. In fact, the appellant could well be forced to resort to public assistance unless 
ictual earnings exceed the statistical probabilities. [ * 3 8 2 ] The alimony award in the present case 
far short of serving the most important function of alimony under the English standard, supra. 
applicable standard of [ * * 7 ] review has been previously set forth by this Court as follows: 
It is well settled that ^ t h i s Court will not disturb the trial court's distribution of property and 
award of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
shown. 
y v. Dority, Utah, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982) (citations omitted). The trial court made no findings 
-ding the appellant's ability to work, n l Given the considerations set forth above and the absence of a 
ig regarding the appellant's actual ability to work now or in three-years' t ime, we believe the trial 
's award to the appellant of $100 per month permanent alimony is a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
stion. ^When such a determination is made, this Court may either make a modification in the decree 
nand for entry of a modified judgment by the trial court. Utah Const. Art. V I I I , Sec. 9; Read v. Read, 
Utah, 594 P.2d 871 (1979); Humphreys v. Humphreys, Utah, 520 P.2d 193 (1974). In the present case, 
the record is inadequate for this Court to modify the decree because the trial court made no findings 
regarding the appellant's ability to work. 
Footnotes 
n l In addressing the appellant's ability to work, the trial court in comments from the bench observed that 
"most people with her health problems work." However, no finding appears in the record about appellant's 
ability to work. Such a finding is critical in view of the fact that appellant would have to show substantial 
"change" in her circumstances if she seeks an increase in her award in the future. Without a specific finding 
on her ability to work based on her present health, any future court reviewing the question will be without a 
"baseline" determination with which to compare her future circumstances. 
End Footnotes [**8] 
On the record before us, it appears that the appellant's health problems will greatly restrict her 
employability. On remand, the trial court must consider whether the appellant has the ability to earn 
enough to supplement the permanent alimony award to a level consistent with the guidelines set forth by 
this Court for determining a reasonable alimony award. I f the trial court finds that the appellant does not 
have this ability, then it should modify its award of permanent alimony accordingly. If the trial court 
believes that the appellant does have this ability, then it should make such a finding of fact. Absent a 
finding regarding the appellant's ability to work, the appellant would be precluded in the future from asking 
the court to modify her alimony award based on changed circumstances if she can show in the future that 
she is unable to work. 
In light of the facts of this case, the factors that must be considered in determining an alimony award, the 
criteria for determining a reasonable alimony award and the absence of a finding regarding the appellant's 
ability to work, we affirm the trial court's temporary alimony award, but reverse the permanent alimony 
award and remand [ * * 9 ] that portion of the judgment to the trial court for additional findings and 
possible modification. 
WE CONCUR: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Dallin H. Oaks, Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice. 
DISSENTBY: HALL 
DISSENT: HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
An examination of the record beyond the formal findings of the trial court reveals the reasonableness of the 
court's decision to limit future alimony to $100 per month. 
It lies well within the discretion of the trial court to enter such orders as will assist the parties in the 
adjustment to single life. In this instance, the court did just that by encouraging the appellant to become 
basically self-supporting over a period of three years. 
The opinion of the Court criticizes the award of alimony as having been made without a finding as to 
appellant's future needs. However, such a finding was neither appropriate nor required. U.C.A., 1953 r § 30-
3-5 vests the court with continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders with respect to 
support and maintenance based upon a change [ * 3 8 3 ] of circumstances. Consequently, there is no need 
for speculation about the future needs of the parties. 
The facts of this case reasonably [ * * 1 0 ] support the conclusion reached by the trial court that the state 
of appellant's health was not such as would preclude her from earning a livelihood. This Court's conclusion 
to the contrary constitutes nothing more than an unwarranted substitution of its judgment for that of the 
trial court. In any event, at the expiration of the three-year period, should circumstances then exist 
requiring a further need for support, under the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5, supra, further relief 
could then be sought. 
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
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